Read the passage and mark the letter A, B, C or D on your answer sheet to indicate the best answer to each of the following questions from 31 to 40.
Neurotechnology’s advance is inexorable: devices that decode neural signals, heighten sensation, or even edit memory are migrating from conjecture to prototype. [I] As these capacities scale, the question ceases to be whether we can probe the mind, and becomes how we should delimit access to it. Neurorights propose ethical guardrails – rules for the custodianship of mental data, the preservation of agency, and protections against covert manipulation – so that intimate cognitive life is not annexed by markets, states, or capricious engineers. Over coming decades, hybrid human-machine systems may normalise brain-computer interfacing, rendering traditional privacy doctrines anachronistic without explicit, enforceable norms.
Much of the urgency springs from experiments that demonstrate engineered control over perception. In 2019, Rafael Yuste’s team induced rats to ‘see’ absent stimuli via implanted electrodes, effectively choreographing neural activity. [II] If comparable interventions reach humans, the boundary between authentic experience and induced state could blur, with profound implications for consent. Such demonstrations complicate reassurances that implants merely record, rather than intervene in, brain states. Hence the call to codify neurorights before ubiquitous deployment: the law must not trail the laboratory by a decade.
Existing medicine already hints at the stakes. Deep-brain stimulation alleviates Parkinsonian tremors and some epileptic seizures; Neuralink and similar ventures pursue bidirectional interfaces that can both write to and read from cortex. [III] With machine learning, such networks might classify affect, steer prosthetics, or decode intent from patterns. If such interfaces matured without safeguards, the intimate traffic of our minds could be surveilled, traded, or coerced at scale. Commercial neuromarketing – or partisan micro-targeting – would then exploit vulnerabilities far upstream of conscious deliberation.
Neurorights sketch a legal-ethical framework: identity must remain intact; free will must be preserved; mental privacy must be inviolable; equal access must curb enhancement inequality; and protection against bias must prevent discrimination by thought-derived data. [IV] The NeuroRights Initiative advances these principles, promotes a corporate Hippocratic pledge, and pushes for global standards; Chile’s constitution now safeguards ‘mental integrity,’ while the OECD and Council of Europe articulate responsible innovation plans. If leading firms accepted such an oath, technological momentum could align with dignity rather than erode it.
(Adapted from Iberdrola – “Neurorights: What are neurorights and why are they vital in the face of advances in neuroscience?”)
Question 31. According to paragraph 1, neurorights chiefly aim to delimit access to the mind so that ______.
A. market or state actors cannot quietly commodify unprotected cognitive data
B. engineers may publish brain datasets while individuals retain retrospective consent
C. courts fully liberalise biohacking, expanding experimental freedom without liability risks
D. surveillance firms get equitable licenses to access anonymised neural signatures
Question 32. The word induced in paragraph 2 mostly means ______.
A. mildly discouraged B. naturally occurring
C. artificially caused D. loosely inferred
Question 33. Which of the following best summarises paragraph 2?
A. A landmark rat experiment shows perception can be engineered, intensifying calls to codify neurorights before human applications erase reliable consent boundaries.
B. Despite hype, laboratory work remains remote from society, so legislation should wait until devices demonstrably outperform conventional therapies in clinical populations.
C. Neuroscience has progressed mainly through noninvasive methods that enhance learning, suggesting ethical concerns are exaggerated and existing privacy doctrines remain adequate.
D. Public fear of implants drives funding cuts, prompting researchers to pivot toward safer, purely external headsets with limited perceptual influence.
Question 34. What does the passage present as the principal function of “neurorights”?
A. To establish enforceable norms preserving agency and privacy against intrusive neurotechnologies worldwide.
B. To accelerate clinical trials so implants reach markets faster than competing therapies.
C. To monetise brain data responsibly, enabling fair profit-sharing for cognitive information users.
D. To centralise oversight within a single global regulator for all neurotech companies everywhere.
Question 35. What does “equal access” aim to prevent?
A. Enhancement reserved for wealthy elites B. Public funding for implant trials
C. Open source brain computer interfaces D. Therapeutic use in severe epilepsy
Question 36. The phrase such an oath in paragraph 4 refers to ______.
A. hippocratic pledge B. legal statute
C. company charter D. consumer code
Question 37. Which of the following best paraphrases the underlined sentence in paragraph 2?
Hence the call to codify neurorights before ubiquitous deployment: the law must not trail the laboratory by a decade.
A. Thus legal innovation should anticipate laboratory developments by ten years, implementing prophylactic prohibitions before empirical evidence of societal harms materializes.
B. Accordingly, scientific communities should establish ethical protocols, as researchers possess specialized expertise enabling more agile normative calibration than statutory processes.
C. Therefore cognitive autonomy frameworks require immediate institutionalization to ensure normative architectures evolve contemporaneously, preventing decade-long regulatory vacuums during deployment.
D. Consequently neurorights articulation may be deferred until deployment substantiates concrete risks, since premature codification risks freezing standards before evidence clarifies.
Question 38. Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?
A. The passage implies that legal and corporate frameworks must develop in parallel with neurotech to preempt harms rather than respond to them after widespread adoption.
B. Because implants have clinical uses, expanding enhancements should proceed without restrictions so therapeutic benefits diffuse across populations and stimulate markets for consumer neural products.
C. Neurorights are primarily intended to facilitate data-sharing agreements, letting governments monetize anonymized cognitive signals for experiments and provision.
D. The examples of Chile, the OECD, and the Council of Europe suggest momentum toward international norms, though enforcement and corporate commitments remain aspirational.
Question 39. Which of the following sentence best fits the passage?
Without complementary legal norms, technical prowess risks redefining personhood by allowing third parties to intrude upon, and monetise, interior mental states.
A. [I] B. [II] C. [III] D. [IV]
Question 40. Which of the following best summarises the passage?
A. Neurotech progress heightens risks; neurorights emerge to safeguard identity, autonomy, privacy, equity, and fairness through law, standards, and corporate pledges.
B. Medical breakthroughs alone justify widespread implants, so public debate should wait until clinicians validate long-term safety beyond research contexts fully.
C. Neural interfaces are harmless marketing tools that will replace phones and improve entertainment, rendering privacy law obsolete and ethical worries largely unnecessary.
D. International initiatives, not basic research, are the main barrier to innovation, constraining therapy and curtailing user choice without delivering measurable safety benefits.