Read the passage and mark the letter A, B, C or D on your answer sheet to indicate the best answer to each of the following questions from 3...

Read the passage and mark the letter A, B, C or D on your answer sheet to indicate the best answer to each of the following questions from 31 to 40.

        In US rental markets, tenants now navigate platforms and “revenue management” tools that determine prices with machine-like indifference. The Department of Justice’s 2024 complaint against RealPage alleges a 21st-century form of coordinated pricing that turns vacancy into leverage rather than relief. If price signals are gamed, competition is not corrected but curdled, and year-over-year spikes feel ineluctable. [I] For renters, the resulting asymmetry – opaque inputs, irreversible recommendations – creates a sense that the market is not merely impersonal; it is actively steered against them.

        RealPage’s software, used across vast multifamily portfolios, stitches together nonpublic data to issue daily rent “guidance.” Clients’ coverage of investment-grade units yields a hegemonic influence over local markets, while default auto-accept settings normalize compliance. According to the DOJ narrative, instead of lowering prices when units languish, the model suppresses availability, thereby manufacturing shortage: this scarcity is then used to justify higher list prices. [II] Declining a recommendation often requires written justification and managerial escalation, making deviation costly, conspicuous, and, in practice, rare.

        Antitrust doctrine, however, still chases evidence of explicit promises. The catch-22 is well known: without discovery you cannot prove a conspiracy; without proof you cannot get discovery. Yet tenants’ filings describe these channels – online forums, standing committees, and a splashy RealPage “RealWorld” conference – where competitors purportedly compare assumptions and harmonize tactics. [III] If courts treat such environments as “collusive communications,” the algorithm would be not a neutral calculator but an accelerant, translating shared inputs into industry-wide, vacancy-proof price floors.

        Alternatives exist: Public, open-source pricing models could set guardrails: real-time affordability metrics, truth-in-pricing transparency, and standardized, auditable datasets. If algorithms were tasked to privilege affordability over yield, rents would likely trend downward across comparable units, provided transparent datasets constrained opportunistic manipulation. Pilots would require federal support, municipal capacity-building, and landlord reporting on demand elasticity so that tenant responses actually recalibrate prices. [IV] Because markets differ, linear and nonlinear models must be locally tuned rather than imposed as one-size-fits-all templates, with consumer-protection agencies updating rules for algorithmic collusion.

(Adapted from Nichole Nelson & Bakari Levy, “How Algorithms and Monopolies Hurt Tenants – and How Tech Can Help,” NCRC, Dec 19, 2024)

Question 31. The word hegemonic in paragraph 2 mostly means ______.

A. moderately contested                                B. marginally influential

C. largely ceremonial                                D. overwhelmingly dominant        

Question 32. Where in the passage does the following sentence best fit?

Critics argue that vacancy should discipline prices, yet software can invert that logic by treating withheld supply as proof of ‘premium’ demand.

A. [I]                        B. [II]                                C. [III]                        D. [IV]

Question 33. Which of the following best summarises paragraph 1?

A. Landlords suffer because algorithms routinely underprice and depress rental revenues.

B. Tenants misunderstand pricing tools that merely mirror ordinary market fluctuations.

C. DOJ allegations recast vacancy as leverage, revealing a market steered against renters.

D. Listing platforms reduce search costs, restoring transparency to urban housing markets.

Question 34. What is RealPage chiefly alleged to have done?

A. Improved tenant credit scores                         B. Facilitated algorithmic price-fixing        

C. Subsidised affordable housing                        D. Eliminated data collection

Question 35. According to paragraph 2, when units remain vacant, the revenue model ______.

A. discourages lowering rents by recommending fewer leases at higher prices

B. mandates deep discounts after thirty days of continuous, documented vacancy

C. shifts marketing budgets toward amenities to boost long-term tenant retention

D. allows managers to undercut rivals without documenting any internal rationale

Question 36. What structural hurdle impedes enforcement, as outlined in paragraph 3?

A. Algorithms cannot be subpoenaed because they are proprietary trade secrets

B. State courts refuse to hear cases involving national rental platforms

C. Tenants lack standing to file suits against large property managers

D. Proof standards demand evidence inaccessible without prior discovery authority

Question 37. The phrase this scarcity in paragraph 2 refers to ______.

A. demand surge                                         B. limited availability                                

C. unit quality                                                D. tenant churn

Question 38. Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?

A. If landlords adopted linear models, courts would automatically deem all algorithmic coordination lawful, eliminating antitrust concerns entirely.

B. Federal agencies already maintain real-time rent dashboards, making additional transparency and data standards largely redundant for affordability goals.

C. Effective pro-tenant pricing tools would likely require public funding, standardized data, and landlord reporting so market responses actually feed back into pricing.

D. Eliminating conferences and committees would immediately remove any possibility of collusion, even if shared data still trains pricing algorithms.

Question 39. Which of the following best paraphrases the underlined sentence in paragraph 4?

Pilots would require federal support, municipal capacity-building, and landlord reporting on demand elasticity so that tenant responses actually recalibrate prices.

A. Pilots can run locally without federal help or landlord reporting because prices will reset automatically regardless of tenant reactions.

B. For pilots to work, they need national backing, stronger city capacity, and landlord data on demand sensitivity so tenant behavior feeds back into pricing.

C. Success hinges only on federal rent caps; city capacity and market data are unnecessary for effective price regulation mechanisms.

D. Pilots should rely on tenant self-reports about supply elasticity, not landlords, and can skip federal involvement entirely for efficiency.

Question 40. Which of the following best summarises the passage?

A. Federal affordability standards already ensure real-time price fairness, rendering antitrust scrutiny largely unnecessary.

B. Market pricing needs no reform; algorithms simply optimise vacancies while protecting tenants from sudden rent increases across cities.

C. RealPage’s tools failed commercially, showing that open-source models outperform proprietary software in every rental submarket.

D. Alleged algorithmic collusion reshapes rents, law lags behind, and public-interest models could re-anchor pricing to affordability with better data and oversight.