Read the passage and mark the letter A, B, C or D on your answer sheet to indicate the best answer to each of the following questions from 6...

Read the passage and mark the letter A, B, C or D on your answer sheet to indicate the best answer to each of the following questions from 6 to 15.

        Budget-setting in communities often pits intensity against fairness. Quadratic Voting (QV) offers a remedy by allocating each participant a fixed credit budget and converting credits to votes via square roots. Placing 100 credits on one line yields 10 votes; splitting 25 credits yields 5 votes, and so on. This non-linear conversion attenuates plutocratic sway while preserving voice. [I] Because costs rise faster than votes, citizens disclose how much they care, not merely what they prefer, within a shared, transparent budget constraint.

        Implementations vary. A “vote faucet” can issue valueless tokens solely for casting votes, or eligibility can be bounded to holders of certain NFTs or proven on-chain behaviors. Organisers may tier voting power by tenure, rewarding patient contributors. [II] Because votes scale with the square root of credits, intensity is expressed without letting large holders overwhelm outcomes. Administrative steps are straightforward: allocate credits, let people distribute them across options, compute squared costs, then tally roots – declaring the highest total the winner.

        QV’s expressiveness helps minority priorities surface in budget debates, yet design choices matter. Selective eligibility can incentivise participation but also create hierarchies that concentrated actors might game. By contrast, Quadratic Funding treats donations equally – many see that level playing field as both virtue and limitation when allocating money. [III] In QV, credits are uniform yet curatable, so communities can include more voices while dampening domination, provided safeguards against Sybil attacks and lobbying are specified ex ante.

        Effectiveness should be measured with turnout targets, distributional patterns across line items, and qualitative feedback on perceived legitimacy. Colorado House Democrats used a QV variant with virtual tokens to prioritise appropriations after 2018, producing clearer signals about salience. Ecosystem experiments, such as Fantom’s Gitcoin rounds, show scalable community budgeting with valueless voting tokens and anti-Sybil checks. [IV] When credits are intelligibly budgeted and metrics reviewed, QV can democratise agenda-setting without cash donations steering public choices.

(Adapted from Gitcoin, “Quadratic Voting: A How-To Guide”)

Question 6. The word attenuates in paragraph 1 mostly means ______.

A. strongly weakens                                        B. slightly complicates

C. marginally increases                                D. abruptly delays

Question 7. What does the square-root conversion primarily accomplish in budget decisions using QV?

A. It maximises total votes by encouraging participants to spend all credits immediately.

B. It equalises outcomes by converting every participant’s credits into exactly the same votes.

C. It reveals intensity without allowing large stakes to translate into overwhelming vote power.

D. It rewards diversification by penalising any attempt to support more than one item.

Question 8. According to paragraph 2, eligibility may be restricted to holders of ______.

A. specific NFTs or addresses exhibiting certain verifiable on-chain behaviours publicly

B. paper membership cards checked manually by volunteer moderators during voting

C. anonymous email lists curated after tallying to reduce collusion incentives

D. algorithmic lotteries assigning eligibility randomly once budgets have been finalised

Question 9. Which of the following best summarises paragraph 3?

A. QV eliminates manipulation entirely by banning hierarchies and guaranteeing identical voice for every participant in all circumstances worldwide today.

B. QF and QV produce the same fairness, because donations and credits are always treated uniformly under both methods across communities.

C. Sybil attacks are trivial to prevent, so communities should prefer unrestricted eligibility whenever budgets must be prioritised quickly and cheaply.

D. QV can surface minority priorities, but eligibility choices may create hierarchies; QF’s equal donations represent a debated “level playing field” alternative.

Question 10. What is tallied to determine the outcome?

A. credits after squaring their totals                        B. the square roots of credits

C. nominal donations from supporters                D. weighted tokens per eligible wallet

Question 11. Where in the passage does the following sentence best fit?

This keeps enthusiasm legible while curbing dominance by any single budget line.
A. [I]                        B. [II]                                C. [III]                        D. [IV]

Question 12. The phrase that level playing field in paragraph 3 refers to ______.

A. NFT gating                B. equal donations                C. Sybil checks        D. vote faucet

Question 13. Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?

A. Because QV eliminates strategic behavior, communities can ignore eligibility rules and metrics, trusting square-root math alone to deliver perfect fairness in every budgeting scenario universally.

B. The Colorado example proves QV always prefers radical minorities, so public budgeting should adopt unrestricted credit limits and unlimited votes to amplify passionate voices everywhere.

C. QV suits budget prioritisation where intensity matters, yet overall fairness depends on careful eligibility design and anti-Sybil measures that constrain domination without muting engagement too.

D. Since QF levels money influence, combining it with QV would nullify minority expression, making both mechanisms redundant for community budgets and governance contexts in practice.

Question 14. Which of the following best paraphrases the underlined sentence in paragraph 2?

Because votes scale with the square root of credits, intensity is expressed without letting large holders overwhelm outcomes.

A. Square-root counting converts every credit into a single vote so large accounts cannot gain more voice than small accounts.

B. Because credits are allocated equally, voters who diversify across items always gain additional votes while concentrating credits inevitably reduces influence.

C. The rule ensures richer participants automatically forfeit extra credits, thereby equalizing outcomes and forcing everyone to express identical intensities.

D. By making vote totals grow with the square root of credits, the rule records strength of preference while preventing big allocations from swamping results.

Question 15. Which of the following best summarises the passage?

A. QV allocates fixed credits, tallies square-root votes, and – if well designed – reveals intensity while tempering dominance in community budget prioritisation and governance.

B. QV replaces budgeting with donations, guaranteeing identical influence and fully preventing manipulation regardless of eligibility, weighting choices, or anti-Sybil requirements across settings.

C. The passage argues that NFTs are necessary for voting and that Colorado proved quadratic funding works best for legislative appropriations after elections.

D. Budgets should be decided by unrestricted token-holder voting because square-root math guarantees fairness without eligibility curation or feedback metrics entirely.