The nineteenth-century “Mill Girls” remind us that solidarity can transmute private hardship into public leverage. They refused the oppressi...

        The nineteenth-century “Mill Girls” remind us that solidarity can transmute private hardship into public leverage. They refused the oppressing hand of avarice, stitched wages to dignity, and helped seed modern unions. Today, something analogous is happening: individuals no longer merely vend hours; they continuously emit monetizable traces. [I] If those traces are corralled collectively – rather than siphoned asymmetrically by platforms – then communities can bargain for remuneration the way workers once bargained for safer looms, shorter shifts, and transparent accounts.

        Across jurisdictions, lawmakers are cautiously legitimising intermediaries that pool personal data on behalf of members. The EU’s forthcoming Data Governance Act explicitly entertains “data cooperatives” as brokers between subjects and users; GDPR already distinguishes controllers and processors. Because personal data is non-rival, multiple firms can exploit the same records simultaneously without depletion. [II] This abundance intensifies power imbalances unless communities acquire vehicles – unions, cooperatives, collectives – to negotiate access terms, constrain misuse, and redirect flows of value back to participants.

        Data pricing remains skewed because incumbents both define the product and set its price; arbitrageurs are scarce. Swash, for instance, surfaces how browsers monetise clickstreams and invites counter-offers; litigation campaigns like the Data Dividend Project contest mispricing and misuse in court. Even when people are not organizing for wages, they can still organise their data to create community income, shifting value from platforms to participants. [III] When legal victories and transparent markets converge, third parties can finally “arb” fairer prices for communities’ digital exhaust.

        There are three mutually reinforcing paths: Policy that recognises data-subject cooperatives; Lawsuits that indemnify communities for misuse; and Tech that automates consent, measurement, and distribution. [IV] If these paths mature together, they could reframe economics, ethics, and human rights around #DataIsLabor, normalising the idea that participation entitles people to a dividend. Dozens of emergent unions already incubate this future, from browser-level plugins to nonprofit trusts, each experimenting with governance that returns agency – and proceeds – to those who generate the raw material.

(Adapted from CoinDesk, “Data Is Labor: Why We Need Data Unions”)

Question 31. According to paragraph 2, because data is non-rival, ______.

A. several firms can exploit identical datasets without reducing anyone else’s usable supply

B. exclusive ownership rights always prevent duplication across interoperable digital markets

C. regulators must license a single controller to maintain scarcity and orderly competition

D. platforms necessarily destroy originals whenever purchasers request processed derivatives

Question 32. The word remuneration in paragraph 1 mostly means ______.

A. ceremonial tribute                                        B. financial compensation

C. social recognition                                        D. contractual obligation

Question 33. Which of the following best summarises paragraph 1?

A. Historical labor unions illustrate how collective leverage can reclaim value from extractive intermediaries.

B. Wage exploitation vanished once factories improved conditions and mechanized most dangerous tasks.

C. Data traces have replaced labor entirely, making industrial precedents irrelevant to digital markets.

D. Individual bargaining power is adequate when platforms publish clear privacy policies and dashboards.

Question 34. What problem does the author describe as a “market failure” in paragraph 3?

A. Platforms unilaterally define data, set prices, and exclude arbitrage that could balance valuations.

B. Users overshare information, causing unavoidable leakage regardless of governance or incentives.

C. Governments overregulate consent, dismantling innovative services and undermining entrepreneurship.

D. Cooperatives demand excessive fees, eroding member payouts and distorting normal market signals.

Question 35. What is Swash, as mentioned in paragraph 3?

A. A browser data-union app                        B. A European court ruling

C. A centralized ad exchange                        D. A nonprofit trust

Question 36. The phrase oppressing hand of avarice in paragraph 1 refers to ______.

A. corporate greed                                        B. state censors

C. labor idleness                                        D. data scarcity

Question 37. Which of the following best paraphrases the underlined sentence in paragraph 3?

Even when people are not organizing for wages, they can still organise their data to create community income, shifting value from platforms to participants.

A. Should individuals refrain from wage bargaining entirely, platforms will proactively establish profit-sharing whenever processing behavioral telemetry, recognizing voluntary distribution enhances retention.

B. Absent traditional labor mobilization, communities may construct alternative revenue streams through coordinated information stewardship, effectively rechanneling surplus platforms previously appropriated.

C. Unless users maintain network participation, collective monetization pathways remain foreclosed because platforms retain ownership over interaction logs, rendering cooperatives legally unviable.

D. On condition regulators prohibit microtargeting, individuals can independently commercialize informational exhaust without cooperatives, as restrictions eliminate platforms’ asymmetric value derivation.

Question 38. Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?

A. Recognition in EU law will likely legitimate data-union practices elsewhere by signalling feasibility, thereby accelerating experiments that blend policy, litigation, and tooling.

B. Data unions will obviate privacy law because collective bargaining inherently secures informed consent and renders statutory safeguards redundant across sectors.

C. Browser plugins alone can resolve mispricing, since transparent dashboards remove any need for courts, regulators, or collective governance structures.

D. Centralized platforms prefer third-party arbitrage because it simplifies accounting and usually increases the prices they must pay for user information.

Question 39. Where in the passage does the following sentence best fit?

Some unions already pilot plug-ins that meter contributions and route micropayments back to members.

A. [I]                                B. [II]                        C. [III]                                D. [IV]

Question 40. Which of the following best summarises the passage?

A. By treating data as labor, communities can unionise through policy, lawsuits, and technology to redirect value and secure a data dividend from powerful platforms.

B. Because data is infinite, markets cannot value it, so governments should nationalise datasets and prohibit private use to prevent corporate profiteering.

C. Traditional unions have no relevance to digital economies, which depend primarily on intellectual property, not collective bargaining or revenue-sharing mechanisms.

D. Litigation is the sole credible path to compensation; cooperatives and technical distribution tools add complexity without delivering measurable community benefits.